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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The concept of benchmarking, originally developed as a tool to improve the performance of business 
enterprises by learning from others￿ ￿best practice￿, is now increasingly applied in the areas of em-
ployment and social policy. Rising internal and external pressures on national welfare states, some-
times reinforced by supra-national institutions, a rapid growth of modern communication technolo-
gies and an ongoing process of ideological liberalization drive this development. Just as benchmark-
ing between companies benchmarking between national social policies is seen as an instrument to 
reduce the costs of pure trial and error.  
However, learning from abroad is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for successful welfare 
state adjustment. First, it is only one possible factor for welfare state change next to many others. 
Second, it does not necessarily lead to policy change because policy makers may be unable or unwill-
ing to implement what they have learned. Third, even if cross-national policy transfer takes place it 
may fail to yield the expected benefits. For a number of reasons the transferability of welfare policies 
across countries may be restricted. Most importantly, policy transfer may be inappropriate if policy-
makers do not pay sufficient attention to the different economic, social, political or ideological con-
text in the importing country. This is especially true when it comes to the great institutional diversity 
of national retirement systems, which are based on highly country-specific policy mixes and which 
display strong interdependencies with other policy areas. Therefore, a large-scale adoption of one-
size-fits-all solutions such as the World Bank￿s three-pillar pension model appears to be problematic.  
The costs of establishing new institutional arrangements form another impediment to policy transfer. 
The extraordinarily high cost of financing the transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pen-
sion system is a case in point. Moreover, the benchmarking of social policies is faced with the diffi-
culty that policy goals tend to be ambiguous or even characterized by harsh trade-offs. Pension re-
formers, for instance, are invariably confronted with the problem of containing rising pension costs 
while ensuring a decent level of social security for the elderly population. Therefore, the notion of 
￿best practice￿ appears to be problematic with respect to social policy reform. Finally, policy makers 
must be concerned with the political risks associated with policy transfer, especially in a political 
minefield such as pensions. For these reasons, policy transfer between welfare states appears to be 
qualitatively different from transfer of ￿best practice￿ between companies.  
Under these conditions, the probability of (appropriate) policy transfer will hinge on two factors. 
First, the more the local conditions and especially the welfare arrangements differ from one country 
to another the more difficult and the less likely policy transfer will be. Second, exchange of informa-
tion will be easier than the transfer of ideas and goals, which on their part will diffuse more easily 
across national borders than concrete policy instruments and institutions. In particular, the import of 
institutions incompatible to existing policy structures may interfere with the balance of power be-
tween societal actors and therefore meet with political resistance.      University of Amsterdam 
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Uncontextualized benchmarking also harbors a great risk of political misuse without promoting seri-
ous and systematic deliberation on alternative reform options. In the public discourse, political inter-
est groups may highlight single, isolated aspects of foreign models in order to propagate the adoption 
of policies that are primarily for their own benefit. Nevertheless, benchmarking may have a beneficial 
impact on national welfare state debates and spur reforms that are in the public interest. It may help to 
unveil existing weaknesses and to highlight the need for action. In so doing, benchmarking may also 
trigger public pressure on governments to take action in areas where they might otherwise avoid po-
litically risky reforms. Moreover, it might uncover potential win-win situations, in which some can 
benefit at no costs to others, and thus help to organize political support among potential reform oppo-
nents.  
With the open method of coordination the EU has established a qualitatively new form of benchmark-
ing. Covering a broad range of policy areas (including pensions) this new mode of governance is ex-
plicitly designed as a means of spreading best practice and ￿ on a voluntary basis - achieving greater 
convergence towards the main EU goals. It is thus considered both a cognitive and a normative tool. 
Regarding both dimensions a lively scholarly debate has emerged about the method￿s strengths and 
weaknesses.  
As a cognitive tool, it appears to be superior to traditional forms of benchmarking typically practiced 
by organizations such as the World Bank or the OECD: It shows greater sensitivity to different na-
tional contexts, pays relatively equal attention to both economic and social concerns (regardless of 
persistent conflicts between socially and economically-oriented players) and includes a broader range 
of actors from civil society such as the social partners. Under these circumstances, it may turn out to 
be a relatively effective instrument of policy learning. Nevertheless, the method should be anchored 
more firmly in the domestic process of policy formation, especially by giving national parliaments a 
greater role in the overall process. This again may induce national governments to deal with the open 
method of coordination and its findings more seriously rather than exploiting it for the mere purpose 
of window-dressing. 
As a normative tool, the potential of the open method of coordination is probably more limited, espe-
cially as far as pension reform is concerned. Here, the open method of coordination is unlikely to 
bring about a greater policy convergence within the EU, even if only at the level of policy outcomes. 
Member states differ greatly in the institutional design of their pension systems, their standards of 
social solidarity, their level of economic development, and their demographic structure. These factors 
will have a significant impact on the way individual member states deal with the trade-off between 
social adequacy and fiscal sustainability. Thus, it appears neither possible nor desirable to press for 
greater convergence by establishing common quantitative targets for all pension systems within the 
EU. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
 




In recent years we observe a growing body of academic literature that explores political processes 
associated with notions such as lesson-drawing, benchmarking, policy learning, policy diffusion, pol-
icy borrowing and policy transfer. To a great extent this reflects the increasing importance of foreign 
models in the public debate about welfare reform. In the second half of the 1990s ￿successful￿ coun-
tries like the Netherlands and Denmark started to capture the attention of policy-makers in the rest of 
Europe. This is especially true for countries like Germany that face persistently high levels of unem-
ployment and increasing difficulties to finance their systems of social protection
1. Learning from 
abroad is seen as an instrument to identify ￿best practice￿ and to provide innovative and more effec-
tive policy options for domestic policy-makers. This paper seeks to address the question whether 
learning from other countries enhances the scope of policy transfer across welfare states and promotes 
the development of effective social policy responses. More specifically, it seeks to clarify whether 
and under which conditions the concept of benchmarking can play an important role in welfare state 
reforms.  
In the first section I will briefly portray the driving forces behind the rapid expansion of efforts of 
national policy-makers to learn from other countries. The second section provides a theoretical reflec-
tion over the potential significance of benchmarking as a causal factor for welfare state developments 
and highlights the numerous barriers to the transfer of ￿best practices￿ from one political setting into 
another one. Against this background, section three discusses the potential and the limitations of the 
so-called ￿Method of open coordination￿ (OMC). This method, which is seen both as a cognitive and 
as a normative tool, has established a new mode of EU governance that may enhance the scope for 
policy learning and policy transfer. As an iterative, multi-level and multi-actor process of policy 
learning based on a broad range of comparable quantitative indicators the OMC constitutes a new 
quality of contextualized benchmarking. As such it may provide domestic policy makers in favor of 
reform with empirically based arguments for the necessity and feasibility of policy change. Finally, I 
will make a few suggestions on how the open method of coordination can be anchored more firmly in 
domestic policy formation.  
                                                
1 Primarily driven by a continued perception of economic crisis the idea of benchmarking has experienced a 
veritable hype in the German political discourse. This is nicely illustrated in a speech given by the former 
Bundespr￿sident Roman Herzog in 1997: ￿Die meisten traditionellen Industriestaaten standen oder stehen vor 
ähnlichen Problemen wie wir. Eine ganze Reihe von ihnen hat aber bewiesen, dass diese Probleme lösbar sind. 
In Neuseeland hat man aus alten, ineffizienten Strukturen eine moderne Kommunalverwaltung aufgebaut. In 
Schweden hat man den überbordenden Sozialstaat erfolgreich modernisiert. In Holland hat man im Konsens 
mit den Tarifpartnern die Arbeitsbeziehungen flexibler gemacht. Folge: die Arbeitslosigkeit ist in Holland dras-
tisch gesunken. In den USA hat eine gezielte Strategie neuartiges Wachstum ausgelöst, das Millionen neue Ar-
beitsplätze geschaffen hat. Ich weiß, hier kommt gleich das Argument, dass nicht alles, was in Amerika 
geschieht, auf uns übertragbar ist und dass wir amerikanische Verhältnisse bei uns auch gar nicht wollen. Das 
ist sicher richtig, aber es darf uns nicht hindern, einmal genauer hinzuschauen. Ich fordere auf, von anderen zu 
lernen, nicht sie zu kopieren!￿ (http://www.bundespraesident.de/frameset/index.jsp)  
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The paper will discuss the chances and limitations of ￿benchmarking￿ and more specifically of the 
OMC with a special focus on pension policy. Pension reform may actually be the litmus test for the 
effectiveness of OMC. Given the tremendous variety of national systems of retirement provision, a 
high degree of path dependency and the strong popular support to public pension schemes, the im-
pediments to structural changes and thereby the hurdles to cross-national policy transfer will be 
stronger than in most other areas of welfare provision. Thus, if open coordination can prove its worth 
in a highly intricate policy area such as pensions, this method may be a promising instrument for wel-
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1. REASONS FOR THE GROWTH OF BENCHMARKING 
 
Efforts at learning from other countries are certainly not new
2. However, there can be little doubt that 
the phenomenon of cross-national benchmarking has experienced a veritable boom in recent years, 
most notably with respect to the comparison of social and labor market policies. Even on the part of 
policy-makers themselves there appears to be a high readiness to learn from other countries. This is 
also true for pension policy, a domain in which structural innovations are particularly difficult to im-
plement. The recent Swedish pension reform, for instance, received widespread attention by pension 
policy-makers all over the world or even served as a blueprint for reform in a number of countries. By 
the same token, the occurrences (or at least attempts) of policy transfer in this area have increased 
substantially (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). A number of partly interrelated factors have contributed to 
the increasing extent of policy diffusion among countries: 
First, within a globalized economy the capacity of national policy-makers to frame their own agenda 
is substantially diminished. Intensifying international competition on product markets and increas-
ingly mobile factors of production may enhance the vulnerability of national welfare states. The po-
tential weaknesses of a national economy tend to be unveiled more easily, which again may intensify 
the search for less vulnerable and more efficient institutional arrangements. This again is likely to 
enhance the willingness to learn from other countries￿ ￿best practices￿. 
Second, irrespective of their exposure to global economic forces many advanced welfare states are 
facing increasing adaptational pressures as a consequence of factors such as rising unemployment, 
demographic ageing and budgetary imbalances. In general, these crisis conditions are favorable to 
policy learning as they may indicate a decline in policy performance and call for a reform of existing 
policies (Hemerijck and Schludi 2000). By contrast, under lenient conditions (typically prevailing in 
most advanced economies until the early 1970s) only exceptionally inappropriate policies will lead to 
the perception of policy failure (Visser and Hemerijck 2001), that might motivate national policy-
makers to adopt innovative policies (￿If it ain’t broke don’t fix it’).  
Third, supra-national institutions, such as the European Union, the OECD, the International Monetary 
Fund or the World Bank, occasionally reinforce existing adaptational pressures. Such organizations 
may recommend or even enforce the transfer of certain policies across countries. The role of interna-
tional organizations with respect to coercive policy transfer has been most pronounced in developing 
economies where the granting of financial aid is often made dependent on the adoption of specific 
policies. For instance, many Latin American countries introduced private and advance-funded pen-
sion schemes in order to get loan approval by the IMF (Brooks, forthcoming). Within the European 
Union pressure for formal harmonization on member states￿ pension policy choices only concerns 
single aspects rather than the overall design of national retirement systems. The removal of regulatory 
                                                
2 A well-known example of early forms of policy learning is the visit of the British Prime Minister Lloyd 
George in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. His intention was to study the Bismarckian social in-
surance schemes (see for example R￿schemeyer and Skocpol 1995 and Hay 1975). University of Amsterdam 
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barriers to labor and capital mobility and the introduction of gender-neutral retirement ages are cases 
in point. 
Fourth, as Dolowitz et al. (2000) point out the rapid expansion of modern communication technolo-
gies, most notably of the Internet, greatly facilitates the exchange of ideas and knowledge as it drasti-
cally lowers the costs of gathering information. 
Finally, an ongoing process of liberalization is creating an increasingly non-ideological, pragmatic 
environment. As a consequence, the ideological barriers that may once have hampered policy learn-
ing between different families of welfare states are at least partly broken down (Cox, 1999). 
 Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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2. POTENTIALITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF BENCHMARKING IN WELFARE 
  REFORM 
 
2.1 THE IDEA OF BENCHMARKING 
 
Benchmarking can be broadly defined as a practical tool for improving performance by learning from 
best practices and the processes by which they are achieved (O￿Reagain and Keegan 2000). The con-
cept of benchmarking, as it is known today, was originally developed by companies operating in an 
industrial environment. In recent years, however, also public or semi-public organizations as well as 
policy makers have sought to make use of this tool. In the political sphere, benchmarking ultimately 
aims at the transfer of policies. Policy transfer can be seen ￿as a process by which knowledge about 
policies and institutional arrangements in place is borrowed to inform, structure and legitimize policy 
change elsewhere￿ (Dyson 2000:260). It is a potentially useful strategy for rationally bounded policy-
makers acting in an increasingly uncertain environment (CPB 1997). As Visser and Hemerijck (2001) 
point out learning from others may avoid some of the costs associated with pure trial and error learn-
ing, such as the costs of numerous trials needed to improve fit, the costs that may result from catas-
trophic error, and the loss of time to reach more effective innovative solutions. Moreover, the greater 
the extent to which cross-national benchmarking unveils the weaknesses of domestic policies (often 
by the use of quantitative indicators showing a country￿s low performance in international rankings), 
the less difficult will it be for reform-oriented policy-makers to legitimize the necessity of adjust-
ments. In the best case, benchmarking may transform the preferences of those actors that tend to de-
fend the status quo. As such, it may serve as an instrument by which political resistance to reform can 
be overcome more easily. By the same token, benchmarking may help to develop and to justify policy 
responses that are unlikely to be discovered within a country￿s existing institutional and ideological 
framework. As such, it may serve as a device to loosen the high path dependency of existing welfare 
state structures (Heinze et al. 2000). 
 
2.2 THE LOOSE LINK BETWEEN POLICY LEARNING AND POLICY CHANGE 
 
Nevertheless, learning as such is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for policy change. 
First, learning from other countries (and consequently the transfer of policies across countries) is only 
one possible factor for welfare state change next to many others ￿ and not necessarily the most impor-
tant one. Theoretical approaches emphasizing policy learning as a driving force behind welfare state 
developments are distinct from alternative explanatory approaches in so far as they are primarily ac-
tor-centered and in so far as they perceive changes in welfare policies as largely driven by exogenous 
factors. Table 1 illustrates the main focus of this approach in a comparative perspective. It should also 
be noted that even the adoption of very similar policies and institutions in different countries is not 
necessarily the result of deliberate policy transfer. It may also be the result of endogenous political University of Amsterdam 
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processes in which policy makers adopt similar responses to common problems (Scherrer 2001). By 
the same token, structural forces may lead to cross-national policy convergence even if policy makers 
themselves made no efforts to learn from other countries.  
     
Table 1: Typology of explanatory approaches to welfare state change 
 
  Exogenous causes  Endogenous causes 
Actor-centered International  diffusion 
Learning from abroad 
Rational Choice 
Power ressources 




Source: Adapted from Schmid 1999:7 
 
Secondly, even if learning occurs it does not necessarily lead to policy transfer. Governments that 
have ￿drawn lessons￿ may be replaced before they can apply them or may lack the will or power to 
implement them. They may even abstain from reform because of what they have learnt. Learning new 
lessons may in itself entail a certain risk for politicians in so far as it tends to unveil the weakness of 
existing policies to investors, opponents and voters (Visser and Hemerijck 2001). Moreover, the iden-
tification of ￿best practice￿ in other countries does not necessarily point out an appropriate strategy by 
which this best practice can be adapted to a different institutional context. By the same token, even if 
policy learning leads to reform, this policy transfer is not necessarily successful. Dollowitz and Marsh 
(2000) identify three important factors that may lead to a situation in which policy transfer misses the 
targets set by policy-makers engaged in this transfer: 
First, policy failure might result from uninformed transfer. The borrowing country may lack sufficient 
information about the policy and the way it operates in the country from which it is ￿exported￿.  
Second, policy transfer is incomplete if crucial elements of what made a certain instrument or institu-
tional arrangement a success in the originating country are not transferred.  
Third, inappropriate transfer denotes a situation in which policy-makers do not pay sufficient atten-
tion to the different economic, social, political or ideological context in the importing country.  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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2.3 IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF ‘BEST PRACTICE’ IN WELFARE STATE REFORM 
 
More often than not such pitfalls will emerge if debates over the (alleged) vices and virtues of foreign 
models are characterized by a strong ideological momentum. To the extent to which the discussion 
over best practices primarily takes place at the level of ideas and policy paradigms the practical prob-
lems as well as the political feasibility of policy transfer will often be ignored. Moreover, the institu-
tional complexity of policy arrangements in the exporting country will often be neglected. The use-
fulness of benchmarking as a device for learning and deliberation on alternative approaches will typi-
cally depend on the recognition that the policy context between the exporting and the importing coun-
try usually differs. Policy makers have to pay due attention to the specific local conditions prevailing 
in the political setting in which innovative instruments, policies, institutions or ideas are to be imple-
mented (Visser and Hemerijck 2001). In particular, interdependencies and complementary relation-
ships between different policy areas and between different policy programs need to be taken into ac-
count, not at least with respect to their impact on the behavior of individuals.   
The promotion of private old-age provision is a good example of how such interlinkages may hamper 
the effectiveness of policy instruments that seem to work well in other countries. Recently, Germany 
and Italy have taken steps to encourage the expansion of private pension plans through generous fis-
cal incentives. Thus, they basically sought to follow the example of countries like the US or Switzer-
land, where a favorable tax regime has contributed to the rapid growth of private retirement savings. 
Thus far, however, the development of take-up ratios fell clearly short of policy-makers expectations 
in both countries. A case can be made that tax deductions alone may not suffice to stimulate private 
old-age provision. The sluggish expansion of private pension plans in Germany and Italy may at least 
partly be attributed to the fact that the cutbacks in the public pension pillar are too half-hearted to act 
as a strong push factor for private old-age provision. In Italy, current workers are largely exempted 
from the drastic reduction of replacement levels associated with the gradual introduction of the new 
contribution-defined pension system. In Germany, the lowering of the pension level will be imple-
mented more quickly but the reduction will be rather modest. Thus, in both countries the weight of 
public social insurance in retirement income provision will shrink only slightly over the next years. 
For one thing, this lowers the incentives to build up supplementary old-age provision on an individual 
basis. Moreover, the continuously high level of contributions to the public schemes narrows the fi-
nancial leeway for employees to set aside money for private old-age provision. These impediments 
were less virulent in countries such as the US or Switzerland, where the modest scope of the public 
pension pillar had provided a more fertile ground for the expansion of private pension plans.   University of Amsterdam 
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Moreover, the stronger the local conditions in the borrowing country deviate from those existing in 
the transferring country the higher will be the costs of transition. Even in the case of an appropriate 
transfer of best practice the costs of this transfer may still exceed the benefits associated with the in-
troduction of a new policy arrangement, at least in the short and medium term. In this case, policy-
makers will have no incentives to depart from the path of institutional development (North 1994). 
Due to the path dependency of institutional arrangements major changes in the institutional order will 
often entail a serious commitment problem, most notably in the domain of social policy. Private ac-
tors typically base their long-term decisions on the expectation that the structure of social policy pro-
grams remains largely unaltered. Major adjustments may therefore be interpreted as a breach of an 
implicit ex-ante agreement between the government and private agents. The latter may see their spe-
cific investments harmed that were based on the status quo ante. This may again undermine the repu-
tation of and the political support for the government (CPB 1997). Pension reform is a typical case in 
point. For instance, the transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded system typically implies a 
massive double payment problem. As a consequence, a fully funded pension system can only be built 
up very slowly even if it is sometimes considered as being less vulnerable to the challenge of demo-
graphic ageing. However, with respect to path-dependence two aspects need to be distinguished. On 
the one hand, technical and practical difficulties may drive up the financial or administrative costs of 
institutional transfer and thereby impede the adoption of policies fact that -net of transaction costs- 
would improve the efficiency of existing institutional arrangements. On the other hand, powerful in-
terest groups may resist institutional reforms if they expect to be the losers of this reform - regardless 
of whether or not the reform increases overall welfare. This will increase the political costs of policy 
transfer and may result in reform blockage (Ochel 2002).  
The applicability of the benchmarking concept in the sphere of public policy, most notably in social 
policy, is also restricted by the ambiguity of the policy goals that are to be achieved. While private 
business enterprises ultimately pursue one overall objective, namely to maximize profit, matters are 
usually more complex in the case of public institutions. For this reason, the notion of ￿best practice￿ 
may be at least misleading in the context of welfare state reform. As a rule, social policy makers have 
to follow several goals at the same time. Moreover, the relationship between these goals may at least 
partly be characterized by a trade-off, i.e. between the aspiration to ensure a high level of social pro-
tection and the goal to limit the tax burden for the working population. Solving a problem in terms of 
one criterion may therefore create problems in terms of other criteria. Thus, in order to asses the per-
formance of welfare state arrangements from a comparative perspective it appears reasonable to think 
in terms of institutions that affect a country￿s position on various trade-offs rather than assuming a 
unique institutional solution that maximizes social welfare (CPB 1997). What is more, the relative 
value attached to specific performance criteria is likely to differ from country to country as well as 
over time. This is especially true for redistributive policies where deviating conceptions of equity and 
solidarity may come into conflict with one another. Whether or not a three-pillar pension system is 
deemed superior to a Bismarckian-type pension system will also depend on the specific criteria for Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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social justice that are applied. Thus, there is no single outstanding and uncontested yardstick to meas-
ure the performance of welfare policies across countries. The definition of ￿best￿ or ￿good￿ practice 
will never be an exclusively cognitive matter but also a highly political issue. Nevertheless, even in 
the political minefield of social policy the notion of benchmarking conveys the mistaken image that 
￿best practices￿ could be defined in a purely technical and apolitical manner (cf. Tidow 1999). 
Another possible impediment to the successful imitation of ￿best practice￿ from other countries needs 
to be considered. Foreign models may owe their relative success at least partly to the fact that their 
policies are not transferred to other countries. For instance, ￿beggar-my-neighbor" strategies may 
work in a small country but would be self-defeating if everybody did adopt them (Scharpf 2002). 
Such concerns are for instance raised with respect to the taxation of mobile capital, where an individ-
ual country may be tempted to attract foreign capital by offering more favorable tax conditions than 
its neighbors. The latter on their part may feel themselves compelled to do the same in order to main-
tain their relative position. In the end, these countries may find themselves in a competitive ￿race to 
the bottom￿ in which each party is likely to loose. Strategies of social or wage dumping involve a 
similar kind of risks. 
Similarly, certain economic strategies (such as the occupation of specific market niches) may be suc-
cessful in small national economies or within a limited set of national economies but may be not vi-
able (or at least less effective) in large economies or on a European-wide or even worldwide scale 
(Schmid 1999). This may also hold true for certain type of welfare policies. The performance of fully 
funded pension systems is a case in point. Thus far, only a limited number of advanced welfare states 
rely to a considerable extent on fully funded forms of old-age provision. Especially within in Europe 
it is primarily small national economies whose pension systems make use of the profits attainable on 
the capital market. At least until recently, these pension systems were able to yield higher rates of 
return than pay-as-you-go based public pension systems. The problem is, however, that the number of 
safe and profit-yielding investments on the international capital market is possibly limited (Krupp, 
1997). To the extent to which the large European economies such as Germany, France, Italy or Spain 
follow the example of countries like the Netherlands and Switzerland and establish fully funded pen-
sion systems on a broad scale this problem may become more severe and international capital markets 
may have greater difficulties to absorb the concomitant increase in the supply of capital. In this sense, 
there might be a sort of first-mover advantage for those countries that expanded fully funded pension 
schemes at an earlier stage.        University of Amsterdam 
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2.4 A  TYPOLOGY FOR THE TRANSFERABILITY OF WELFARE POLICIES 
 
Hence, benchmarking may be a useful instrument to foster policy learning but its actual impact on 
welfare state development is probably more limited than the recent hype of studies, articles and es-
says over benchmarking both in the academic literature and in the popular press may suggest. We can 
identify a number of reasons why a simple copying of foreign solutions will often be inadequate or 
unavailable. With respect to social policy reform the potential of benchmarking in terms of appropri-
ate policy transfer will depend on at least two factors.  
First, as already noted, the transferability of successful policies will be the more difficult the more 
strongly the local conditions in the borrowing and the transferring country deviate from one another. 
As a rule, institutional learning and policy transfer will only be possible within clusters of countries 
whose economic and political conditions are at least roughly comparable, i.e. between highly devel-
oped market economies. However, even within this group the local conditions may still be so differ-
ent that the potential for policy transfer is severely restricted (Ochel 2002). The impediments to pol-
icy transfer are particularly strong between countries belonging to different welfare state families. To 
be sure, a comparison between countries as different as Germany and the United States may increase 
the knowledge about the theoretically possible policy options and instruments to a greater extent than 
comparisons between countries with very similar welfare arrangements such as Germany and Austria. 
Zeitlin (2003) regards institutional diversity as an asset providing greater opportunities for policy 
learning due to a wider range of experiences and perspectives on which policy-makers can draw. It is 
questionable, however, whether national policy elites consider the adoption of radically different 
policies as applicable to their own country. More often than not, the import of such policies will turn 
out to be very difficult for both practical and political reasons. As Scharpf (2002) points out, British 
(and probably German) voters would be unlikely to accept the high levels of taxation that is needed to 
finance the generous welfare state in Sweden, whereas Swedish families could not live with the mod-
est level of family services provided in Germany. Similarly, both Swedish and German voters would 
fiercely oppose any attempt to abolish earnings-related public pensions and to replace it by a public 
basic pension. By contrast, if the imported policies are highly compatible to existing policies (i.e. re-
quiring only minor institutional adjustments) as well as to the ideological heritage of a welfare state, 
they will not seriously violate voters￿ expectations and not interfere with the balance of power be-
tween societal actors. In short, political resistance will be more limited. Therefore, the scope for ap-
propriate policy transfer appears to be greater between countries with similar welfare arrangements 
(CPB 1997; Scherrer 2001).  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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Second, the potential for appropriate policy transfer from one political system to another will also 
depend on what is actually transferred. Dollowitz et al. (2000) identify eight different categories in 
that regard: Policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy programs, institutions, ideologies 
and attitudes and negative lessons. It should be noted, however, that transfer may also be confined to 
the mere exchange of information. Dollowitz et al. (2000) also distinguish between four different de-
grees of policy transfer:  
•  Copying, understood as direct and complete transfer 
•  Emulation, involving the transfer of the ideas behind a certain policy 
•  Combinations, i.e. mixtures of several different policies and 
•  Inspiration, where policy in another jurisdiction inspires policy change, but where the final 
outcome does not actually built upon the original 
 
In essence, these categories can also be understood as a wide continuum of transferable elements. 
This continuum ranges from the mere exchange of information over the abstract level of ideas, prob-
lem definitions and policy goals all the way down to concrete policy instruments and institutions. To 
be sure, cross-national policy transfer will be easiest at the level of information, especially as a result 
of the rapid expansion of modern communication technologies in recent years. The reason is, that the 
mere exchange of information about other countries￿ policies typically does not involve any norma-
tive issues such as the adoption of certain ideas or policy objectives. I also argue that general ideas, 
concepts and problem definitions will be adopted more easily than concrete policy programs or insti-
tutions whose implementation in another political setting may raise serious practical problems and 
meet with considerable political resistance by the concerned interest groups. This is especially true 
for the transfer of institutions whose development tends to be highly path-dependent and the reform 
of which may cause high transaction costs. By contrast, the transfer of ideas and concepts at a pure 
abstract level affecting the national policy discourse rather than policy structures themselves is typi-
cally not associated with measurable economic costs. Thus, theoretical models and framings will flow 
much more easily across national borders than actual practices (Scherrer 2001).    
Through the combination of both dimensions we are able to arrive at a typology that depicts the po-
tential for (successful) transfer of welfare policies (see table 2). In the following, I will illustrate this 
typology by taking pension policy as an example. As suggested above, the exchange of information 
across countries is relatively unproblematic, at least in countries with easy access to modern commu-
nication technologies. There, policy makers are usually well informed about pension systems or pen-
sion reforms in other countries. In fact, the strongest impediment to this kind of transfer may lie in the 
restricted capacity of policy makers to handle an over-supply in available information (Quadrant I). 
Quadrant II denotes a situation in which one country seeks to emulate an idea or concept behind a 
certain policy pursued in another country with a similar economic, social, political and ideological 
context. Here, the conditions for an appropriate policy transfer appear to be relatively favorable. For 
instance, many countries with pension systems of the Bismarckian-type draw inspiration from the University of Amsterdam 
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German example of lifetime earnings as calculation basis for pension benefits and adopted the idea 
that the link between contributions and benefits needs to be tightened. This idea was perfectly con-
formable to the concept of earnings-related social insurance. Moreover, as long as this idea was not 
transformed into concrete legislative proposals (implying tangible benefit cuts for certain groups of 
beneficiaries) there was no major ideological conflict over the general appropriateness of this princi-
ple. By contrast, the idea of a tighter link between contributions and benefits is unlikely to guide pol-
icy-makers in countries where the public pension system is oriented towards the provision of basic 
security. The latter countries often chose a completely different route to curtail pension spending and 
introduced or reinforced elements of means-testing, an option that would again not be acceptable in 
the case of contributory pensions as they prevail in the Bismarckian systems (Myles and Pierson 
2001). This illustrates, why the transfer of certain policy ideas across countries belonging to different 
welfare regimes may be hampered by ideological and institutional legacies. 
Policy transfer will be even more difficult at the level of concrete policy instruments. Here again, dif-
ferent local conditions appear to be an obstacle to the adoption of similar solutions. For example, 
countries displaying a favorable labor market situation may be more willing to introduce a higher re-
tirement age than countries with a high level of unemployment (quadrant IV). However, even in 
countries with similar conditions (i.e. low unemployment) such a measure may fail for political rea-
sons. Political interest groups may for instance try to impede the adoption of a higher retirement age 
because it affects the self-interests of their members (quadrant III). 
 
Table 2: Potential for cross-national policy transfer  
 
Local conditions   
Transferable elements  SIMILAR DISSIMILAR 
Information about policies  (I) Very high potential for diffusion  
Ideas/ Goals/ Problem definitions  (II) Potential for policy 
transfer/diffusion high 
(III) Problem of consen-
sus  
Policy programs/ Institutions/ Instru-
ments/ Legislative measures  
(IV) Problems of technical 
compability and political 
feasibility 
(V) Potential for policy 
transfer limited 
Adapted from Schmid 1999 
 Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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A case can be made that political factors, such as the power of the state and the influence exerted by 
various interest groups may in fact be the main impediment to the international transfer of institu-
tions. As Ochel (2002) points out, power relations may have a significant impact on the perception 
and selection of advantageous institutional arrangements. They may also play a role in persuading 
important societal groups at home that specific arrangements are beneficial, and in introducing or ap-
plying these arrangements. As argued above, powerful societal interest groups will try to prevent the 
transfer of innovative and potentially welfare-enhancing policies from other countries as long as they 
expect to be the losers of this reform. Their capacity to do so will among others depend on the degree 
to which these interest groups control the crucial veto points in the political decision-making process 
(Immergut 1992).  
 
2.5 THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BENCHMARKING ON NATIONAL WELFARE STATE DEBATES 
 
At this point I do not want to enter into the more general scholarly debate over the impact of political 
institutions on the capacity of policy-makers to adopt reforms against the resistance of relevant politi-
cal and societal actors. Instead, I will briefly discuss whether an appropriate strategy of benchmarking 
may help to change national debates over welfare state reform in a way that potential reform oppo-
nents can be persuaded on the benefits associated with the (partial) transfer of foreign policies. This 
presupposes that the proponents of such a transfer are able to transform or at least to influence the 
interests and preferences of other actors in a desired direction. The problem is that the perception of 
the advantageousness of institutional arrangements is itself tied to interests (Scherrer 2001). This 
again has powerful implications for the degree to which certain policy options are already filtered out 
at the stage of agenda setting. As Ochel (2002:19) aptly puts it:  
“In the national discourse on institutional reform, only those institutions or arrangements which are 
deemed compatible with the interests of the elites and the influential interest groups are admitted to 
the debate. The ability of central actors in society to convince others of the advantages of foreign ar-
rangements depends among other things on whether they succeed in presenting the economic prob-
lems under discussion as being so threatening, that they can only be dealt with successfully by adapt-
ing foreign institutions, which are presented as having coped successfully with the problem. This abil-
ity will be all the greater, the more influence these central actors have in the process of opinion for-
mation.” University of Amsterdam 
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Thus it appears that benchmarking may influence the national debates over welfare state reform in a 
number of ways: First, it may ￿ at least to a certain extent - force representatives of various interest 
groups to acknowledge unpleasant facts. Typically, this is achieved through the provision of solid 
empirical data based on quantitative indicators, which may illuminate a country￿s poor performance 
in comparison to its competitors. Such indicators are especially important in areas such as pension 
policy, where a commonly shared diagnosis of the problem is often complicated by the fact that the 
political decisions of contemporary policy-makers are typically based on long-term scenarios of fu-
ture economic and demographic trends, which are generally associated with massive uncertainties. 
However, once there is a principal agreement on the empirical facts or on the likelihood of certain 
scenarios it will also become easier to arrive at a common understanding on the nature of the problem 
and perhaps on adequate policy responses.  
Second, and strongly related to the former aspect, the use of quantitative benchmarks may exert con-
siderable ￿moral pressure￿ on national governments.  It may even lead to a process of ￿naming and 
shaming￿ in which domestic actors blame their own governments for the poor performance of their 
country in comparison to others and, consequently, for their reluctance to address pressing problems. 
To be sure, this effect will be strongest if benchmarking is based on clear-cut international rankings, 
which may reveal quite drastically ￿ and often in an overly simplistic manner ￿ that some countries 
are much worse in achieving certain goals than others
3. This may in itself motivate national policy 
makers to take (at least symbolic) action in order to demonstrate their willingness ￿to do something 
about it￿. However, we also can detect instances where national governments sought to prevent non-
governmental organizations such as the OECD from publishing critical assessments of their policies
4. 
This provides a strong indication that governments are highly sensitive to the dissemination of un-
pleasant facts by third party organizations because they may see the concomitant negative publicity as 
a threat to their domestic political standing.  
Third, learning from abroad may reveal examples of ￿good practice￿ or at least enhance the knowl-
edge about potentially effective policy responses. More specifically, it may reveal instances of how 
other countries have managed to rationalize their social policy programs without giving away their 
redistributive aspirations. By the same token, benchmarking may help to identify policy options that 
satisfy the value preferences of both the left and right and are therefore particularly attractive to prag-
matic policy reformers (Cox 1999). Hence, as Trubek and Mosher (2001) aptly put it “policy learning 
might produce win-win situations in which some can benefit at no cost to others, or where gains are 
so large than modest cost increases or losses to some can be accepted”. This may explain, why the 
recent pension reform in Sweden inspired pension policy-makers in countries as different as Latvia, 
Poland, Italy and Ireland. In Sweden, a broad cross-party coalition introduced an entirely new pension 
                                                
3 For instance, the German public was buzzing with excitement when the so-called PISA study revealed the 
country￿s mediocre performance with respect to schooling (Sch￿fer 2002).    
4 A particularly revealing example is the recent OECD economic survey on Germany. After massive interven-
tions by the German government the OECD felt itself compelled to water-down or even to remove the most 
critical passages in the report, for instance about the precarious fiscal sustainability of the pension system and 
the need to lower labor costs (see Handelsblatt, 28th of May 2003).  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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pension system based on an innovative policy mix that was acceptable to representatives of very dif-
ferent political stripes. 
Nevertheless, references to other countries￿ experiences may still not be sufficient to convince poten-
tial reform opponents about the necessity of a change of the status quo. One reason may be that such a 
change, while potentially increasing overall welfare, may still impose an additional burden on indi-
vidual interest groups. However, even in this case benchmarking may be a useful instrument for re-
form-oriented players to influence the national discourse over welfare state reform. It may bring for-
ward new facts and arguments that help to invalidate or at least to weaken the arguments made by the 
proponents of the status quo. This again may enhance support by the larger public and possibly lower 
the political costs of reform. The discussion over fully funded pensions is a case in point. Until re-
cently, the proponents of increased funding could easily justify their position with reference to the 
large number of countries in which capitalized pension schemes have yielded extraordinarily high 
rates of return. As a consequence, the defenders of pay-as-you-go based pension systems had a hard 
time to make themselves heard in the public debate.  
 University of Amsterdam 
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3. THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION 
 
As pointed out above, the value of benchmarking as a learning instrument crucially depends on the 
way international comparisons are contextualized. As Hemerijck and Visser (2001) point out, a de-
contextualized form of benchmarking, that ignores the local conditions under which policies must be 
implemented, often serves a primarily political or ideological pressure. Insofar, benchmarking may 
also be employed in a purely strategic and potentially counterproductive manner. In national debates 
over welfare reform representatives of all political stripes and interest groups tend to pick out single 
aspects of foreign models in order to persuade others of the correctness of their own position. For in-
stance, representatives of the German banking and insurance industry pressed strongly for the estab-
lishment of Anglo-Saxon type pension funds, a claim that is arguably driven by their own profit inter-
ests rather than by concerns about the general public interest. As Scherrer (2001) points out several 
German proponents of the US model pleaded for wage moderation and welfare state regulation at a 
stage when unemployment in the US was still considerably higher than in Germany. More often than 
not, such debates lead to rather arbitrary findings, which actually do not stimulate serious deliberation 
on alternative approaches (Husmann, 2002). With respect to pension policy the German discussion 
over the Swiss three-pillar model of old age provision is a case in point. Market-liberal apologists 
emphasize the modest contribution rates to the first pillar and the great leeway that is given to 
occupational and private provision. By contrast, their antagonists on the left side of the political 
spectrum focus on the universal and highly redistributive character of the public tier and call for a 
mandatory system of occupational pensions according to the Swiss model. While both sides highlight 
specific aspects of the Swiss model, they disregard other crucial aspects and thereby lose sight of the 
overall architecture of the system. This illustrates the need for a synergetic and more systematic type 
of benchmarking by which a foreign policy is investigated as a whole and with respect to its intercon-
nections to other areas of social and economic regulation
5.    
At the Lisbon summit in spring 2000 the European Union established a new mode of European gov-
ernance, known as the open method of coordination (OMC), which can also be seen as an effort to 
arrive at a qualitatively new, contextualized form of benchmarking. Moreover, several authors (cf. 
Dehousse 2002; Hemerijck 2002) expect the open method of coordination to contribute to a signifi-
cant degree of de-politicization of the issues at stake and to a more problem-oriented style of policy 
making. According to the Presidency Conclusions at the Lisbon European Council this method is es-
tablished as a ￿a means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the 
main EU goals. This method, which is designed to help Member States progressively develop their 
own policies, involves: fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achiev-
ing the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; establishing, where appropriate, 
quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to 
                                                
5 A thorough performance analysis of the Swiss multi-pillar pension system is for instance provided by Queisser 
and Vittas (2000). University of Amsterdam 
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the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing good practice; translating 
these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting 
measures, taking into account national and regional differences; periodic monitoring, evaluation and 
peer review￿ (cited in Working Group 2001). 
Meanwhile, the OMC covers a broad variety of policies, such as employment, information society, 
research policy, entrepreneurial policy, anti-exclusion policy, enterprise policy, education policy, EU 
enlargement and pension reform (for an overview see Hodson and Maher 2001). While procedures 
differ among these policy areas, a number of common characteristics can be identified (Jacobsson and 
Schmid 2002; Scharpf 2002): 
•  Subsidiarity.  Policy choices remain at the national level and legislation at the European level 
is explicitly excluded.  
•  Flexibility. Norms and guidelines are revisable in the light of evaluation and new informa-
tion. Moreover, the OMC respects the diversity of national systems and is open for the adap-
tation to specific circumstances; 
•  Multi-level integration. The OMC is open for a role of sub-national actors in policy formula-
tion and implementation; 
•  Inclusion and participation. The OMC allows for participation of various actors of civil soci-
ety; 
•  Deliberation. The OMC is a deliberative process providing ample room for discussion and 
arguments based on solid empirical data and common indicators of achievement.  
•  Knowledge-sharing. The OMC also builds on sharing of knowledge and experiences and on 
learning from others; governments are willing to expose their own plans to comparative dis-
cussion and to make their own performance subject to peer review; 
•  Softness. There are no formal sanctions, if a member state does not achieve agreed-upon 
standards. Coordination is based on voluntary cooperation.  
 
Thus, the open method of coordination clearly deviates from old-style European governance of hier-
archical and uniform regulation and establishes a new mode of governance that can be characterized 
as procedural, heterarchical and flexible (Eberlein and Kerwer 2002). This novel procedure is increas-
ingly applied in the sphere of social policy where a large-scale harmonization of country-specific ar-
rangements is de facto precluded by great differences in levels of economic development within the 
European Union as well as by the sheer institutional diversity of national welfare states (Scharpf 
2002).  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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3.1 THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION AS A NEW FORM OF CONTEXTUALIZED 
  BENCHMARKING 
 
At the same time, however, the open method of coordination establishes a qualitatively new form of 
contextualized benchmarking. This becomes evident if one compares the open method of coordina-
tion with the type of benchmarking pursued by international organizations such as the OECD and the 
World Bank. There, often one example of ￿excellence￿ is praised for all others to follow (Hemerijck 
2002). The three-pillar pension model advocated by the World Bank is a case in point
6. The World 
Bank￿s approach was to design an optimal pension system serving as a general blueprint for pension 
policy makers throughout the world. However, as Myles and Pierson (2001) point out, the adoption of 
the World Bank￿s three-pillar- model is no longer a viable option in the policy menu of countries with 
a mature pay-as-you-go system.  Perhaps most importantly, the political costs of such a radical transi-
tion would be prohibitive in any democratic polity.  
Another revealing example is the comparison between the OECD Jobs Strategy and the European 
Employment Strategy (which can be said to draw on the principles of the open method of coordina-
tion without actually bearing this label). As Casey (2002) shows there are some similarities in diagno-
ses, and some similarities in recommendations. However, he also shows that ￿the European strategy 
is more aware of the potentially negative outcomes that can result from following through some of its 
recommendations. Accordingly, it is more willing to counsel caution, and more willing to suggest the 
need for compensatory actions.  That it does so is a corollary of it being influenced by a “social 
model” in a way that the OECD strategy is not￿ (p.17). Moreover, he states that ￿the European strat-
egy places much more weight on the contribution of the ‘social partners’ to policy formulation, exe-
cution and evaluation” (p. 11).  
Similar differences between the two organizations can also be observed with respect to their evalua-
tion of national pension strategies. Moreover, it appears that the OECD is more assertive with respect 
to the desirable direction of pension reform. For instance, in a 1998 report the OECD suggests a shift 
towards defined-contribution arrangements and argues that pension system in most OECD countries 
are too tilted towards collective rather than individual provision. Initially, a similar approach pre-
vailed at the EU level. In December 2000 the European Commission put forward a communication in 
which it called explicitly for a tighter link between benefits and contributions and for a greater role of 
fully funded pension schemes. In the meantime, however, a much more cautious approach has 
emerged. In a joint report by the Social Protection Committee and the Economic Policy  
                                                
6 The World Bank (1994) recommends a publicly managed and tax-financed first pillar providing for basic se-
curity needs. This is to be supplemented by a mandatory, privately managed and fully-funded second pillar, 
which again might be topped up by voluntary occupational or individual savings plans as the third pillar. University of Amsterdam 
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Committee on objectives and working methods in the area of pensions, published in November 2001, 
(Council of the European Union 2001) these recommendations do no longer appear. This illustrates 
that a high degree of openness, i.e. great sensitivity towards the diversity of national systems and con-
sequently a reluctance to launch ￿one-size-fits-all￿ recommendations has emerged as the central char-
acteristic of the open method of coordination.  
I the following section I do not intend to recapitulate at length the genesis of the open method of co-
ordination as a new mode of European governance. This has been done at great length elsewhere (see 
for instance de la Porte and Pochet 2002). I also do not want to enter the academic debate about the 
democratic legitimacy of this instrument. Instead, I will discuss the potential effectiveness of the open 
method of coordination as an instrument to promote reform efforts at the national level. In particular, 
I want to go further into the question whether the open method of coordination can possibly overcome 
the shortcomings associated with traditional forms of benchmarking that often do not pay sufficient 
attention to the local conditions prevailing in a specific political setting. In doing so this paper may 
also contribute to bridge the academic gap that currently exists between studies engaged in the com-
parative or historical analysis of domestic policy across different families of European welfare states 
and studies analyzing the role and possible future of EU policy (Visser and Hemerijck 2001). With 
respect to welfare reform both arenas have become increasingly intertwined in recent years, a process 
that is likely to intensify in the near future.  
 
3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION IN THE AREA OF  
  PENSIONS  
 
At first, I will briefly recapitulate the previous developmental stages of the open method of coordina-
tion in the area of pensions, followed by a short lookout for the steps that are planned for the near fu-
ture (see Schulz-Weidner 2002). In a communication of July 1999 the European Commission had 
called for a deeper co-operation among member states in the area of social protection, which should 
among others focus on the issue of safe and sustainable pensions. This set in motion a wide debate on 
this issue involving different European Councils and various Committees. As mentioned above, the 
open method of coordination was formally established at the Lisbon European Council in March 
2000, thus codifying practices that had already been applied in the context of the European Employ-
ment Strategy (Hodson and Maher 2001). The innovation at Lisbon consisted in the application of 
these practices to other policy areas so as to render the EU ￿the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion” (European Council 2000). A reform of pension systems was explicitly 
defined as part of this broader strategy
7.  
                                                
7 The Lisbon European Council requested among others "a study on the future evolution of social protection 
from a long-term point of view, giving particular attention to the sustainability of pension systems" and a report 
on the contribution of public finances to growth and employment, which, inter alia, considered the sustainability 
of public finances in the light of ageing populations. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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It needs to be noted that the main impetus for a coordination of national pension strategies came from 
those actors primarily concerned with budgetary matters, most notably from the Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC). Clearly, this can be seen as a spillover effect of EMU. As early as 1997 the EPC 
submitted a statement concerning the pension problematique. In November 2000 it put forward a first 
report on the impact of ageing populations on public pension systems, which subsequently was up-
dated and accepted by the ECOFIN council in November 2001. In the report the EPC gave clear rec-
ommendations concerning the future direction of pension reform (p. 8, accentuations by the author):       
(i)  The containment of the benefits should represent the main instrument for guaranteeing the 
  solvency of the pay-as-you-go pension system. In order to limit the reduction in the standard 
  of living of the elderly, reforms should primarily aim at delaying retirement. 
(ii)    The breathing space that pension expenditure projections outline for the next few years 
  should be used to meet the ageing of the baby-boom generation and put it on a sounder fiscal 
  policy footing. Public debt decumulation would also smooth the changes to be implemented 
  in present pension policies. 
(iii)    The link between social contributions and benefits at the individual level should be 
 strengthened in order to limit the negative effects of contributions and benefits on the labour 
  market and employment. 
(iv)   The role of funded schemes should be gradually increased. Public policies should support 
  this development by providing a legal and fiscal framework, but without hampering the 
  process of budgetary consolidation. 
 
These recommendations were not uncontested. For one thing, these recommendations were largely 
based on indicators measuring the level and the projected development of public pension expendi-
tures. As a consequence, countries relying on a large public pension pillar came off worse in this 
ranking than countries with a modest public pension tier (Schulz-Weidner 2002). As a consequence, 
representatives of the former country group criticized the insufficient neutrality of the selected indica-
tors vis-￿-vis different types of retirement provision (see for instance Ruland 2002).  
Moreover, social policy players took issue with the insufficient attention paid to social objectives 
(Briet 2002). As a consequence, these actors sought to establish an institutional counterweight to the 
hitherto dominating position of financial actors in the pension debate at the European level. With re-
spect to policy content they sought to prevent the emergence of a paradigm according to which priva-
tization is seen as the key response to the solution of the pension crisis. The Directorate General for 
employment and social affairs of the Commission therefore drafted two communications in October 
2000 (European Commission 2000a) and July 2001 concerning the basic principles and the general 
objectives of European pension policy. In addition, in June 2000 the so-called Social Protection 
Committee was formally established. This body is expected to do the preliminary work for the Social 
Affairs Council in areas such as social exclusion and pension reform. Initially, this work was done in 
parallel to and uncoordinated with the work of the EPC. As a consequence, the formulated objectives University of Amsterdam 
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and policy recommendations of the two bodies deviated significantly from one another. For instance, 
in its report of June 2000 the SPC placed a far greater emphasis on various aspects of social cohesion 
than the EPC and avoided any pleading in favor of increased funding.  
In order to arrive at a greater harmonization between the different positions of social policy makers 
on the one hand and economic policy makers on the other the European Council in Stockholm and 
Gothenburg (June 2001) engaged both commissions to draft a joint report. This represented the be-
ginning of the formal application of the open method of coordination to the domain of pension policy. 
Against this background the joint report - presented in November 2001 ￿ proposed a set of rather 
broad common objectives and working methods in order to create an integrated framework for policy 
co-operation in this field (Council of the European Union 2001). It explicitly seeks to enhance consis-
tency between a range of existing EU processes which, as part of their wider remit, deal with specific 
aspects of pension policies: The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the Stability and Growth 
Pact focus on the economic and fiscal implications of ageing. The Employment Strategy European is 
concerned with the impact of pension systems on the labor market, in particular as regards employ-
ment ratios for older workers. Finally, the Social Inclusion Process (initiated at the Lisbon European 
Council) deals with the role of pension systems in the fight against poverty and social exclusion (see 
table 3). The open method of coordination is seen as an instrument that may ensure or at least im-
prove coherence between these hitherto rather uncoordinated processes. 
The framework established in the joint report is designed to help member states to develop their own 
national strategies for securing adequate and sustainable pensions. While explicitly acknowledging 
the principle of subsidiarity it seeks to launch a mutual learning process. This process includes peri-
odical monitoring of the progress made by each member state on the basis of commonly agreed and 
defined indicators. However, in contrast to the European Employment Strategy, it does not envisage 
any individual recommendations to a member state.  Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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Table 3: EU processes related to pension policy 
 
Process  Goal  Link to pension policy 




Economic and budgetary implications of 
ageing  
Stability and Growth 
Pact 
Sound public finances  Budgetary implications of ageing 
European Employment 
Strategy 




Eradication of poverty 
and social exclusion 
Old-age poverty/ Inclusiveness of pension 
schemes 
 
Altogether, eleven pension policy objectives were proposed in the report and endorsed by the Laeken 
European Council in December 2001. These were summarized under the three headings: safeguarding 
the capacity of systems to meet their social objectives, maintaining their financial sustainability and 
meeting changing societal needs (see box 1)
8. While justified by a rather vague notion of a common 
￿European Social Model￿ these objectives remain at a rather general level and do not suggest con-
crete reform proposals. For instance, the declaration contains the very abstract postulation ￿that mem-
ber states should promote solidarity within and between generations￿ without stating this objective 
more precisely. Under the heading of financial sustainability of pension systems the report suggests a 
￿fair balance between the active and the retired by not overburdening the former and by maintaining 
adequate pensions for the latter￿. Here again, the Council has avoided setting clearly specified tar-
gets. Concrete recommendations for action as the Economic Policy Committee suggested them in its 
earlier reports (such as a tighter link between contributions and benefits or an increased role of funded 
elements) do no longer appear. Moreover, in contrast to the European Employment strategy no indi-
vidual recommendations are given to the member states. Arguably, the European objectives estab-
lished with respect to pension reform form the lowest common denominator between social and eco-
nomic policy makers on the one hand and between EU member states with their highly diverse pen-
sion arrangements on the other.  
                                                
8 For the complete version as stated in the report see appendix.    University of Amsterdam 
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Box 1: Common European objectives in the area of pensions 
 
Adequacy of pensions 
1)  Preventing social exclusion 
2)  Enabling people to maintain living standards 
3) Promoting  solidarity 
Financial sustainability of pension systems 
4) Raise  employment  levels 
5)  Extend working lives 
6)  Making pension systems sustainable in a context of sound public finances 
7)   Adjust benefits and contributions in a balanced way 
8)  Ensure that private pension provision is adequate and financially sound 
Modernization of pension systems in response to changing needs of economy, society and indi-
viduals 
9)   Adapt to more flexible employment and career patterns 
10)  Meet the aspirations for greater equality of women and men 
11)  Demonstrate the ability of pension systems to meet the challenges 
 
The report also sketched a concrete time schedule concerning the further steps to be taken. This time 
schedule was also confirmed at the Barcelona European Council in March 2002. The member states 
were invited to put forward national strategy plans by September 2002, taking into account the eleven 
objectives endorsed by the Laeken European Council. The national reports should contain a diagnosis 
of the major challenges as well as information on reforms that have been carried out recently or that 
are in preparation. Member states are also encouraged to include data that allow an assessment of the 
medium and long-term impact of current policies and reforms undertaken or planned. Nevertheless, 
the national strategy reports differ somewhat in their specific focus. It is also remarkable that some 
countries issued rather extensive assessments of their pension strategies (such as the Greek report 
comprising more than 100 pages) whereas others provided only relatively brief strategy reports (the 
Portugese report, for instance, only comprises 33 pages). This might also indicate that some member 
states take the open method of coordination more seriously than others. On the basis of the national 
strategy reports the Council and the Commission provided a joint report to the European Council in 
March 2003
9. The aim of the report was to evaluate member states￿ progress with respect to the 
achievement the commonly agreed objectives (without, however, suggesting a one-size-fits-all policy 
response for all member states). In the report, no formal ranking is established between member 
states. As the Commission itself argues, such a ranking would be difficult to establish in practice: a 
                                                
9 In December 2002 the Commission had already presented a draft version of this report (European Commission 
2002). Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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country performing well in terms of adequacy is likely to do less well with respect to financial sus-
tainability
10. However, the report reveals substantial differences in the degree to which the member 
states accomplish the commonly agreed objectives and identifies the need for further action in indi-
vidual cases. This is most apparent with respect to the objective of financial sustainability and sound 
public finances. In this dimension, the Commission makes the clearest distinction between successful 
countries and latecomers
11. Sweden and the United Kingdom are identified as countries whose pen-
sion systems appear to be financially sustainable. For a second country group (including Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland) the report concludes that their public pension 
systems appear to be close to being financially sustainable. In the remaining group of countries the 
Commission regards further reforms as necessary (including measures to ensure sound public fi-
nances). The greatest need for action is diagnosed for Greece, Spain, France and Austria, countries in 
which the expected increase in public pension expenditure is large and above the EU average. How-
ever, the report also indicates deficiencies concerning the adequacy of pensions in a number of coun-
tries such as Greece and Portugal. Hence, by identifying weaknesses in the design of national pension 
policies the report may very well exert some indirect ￿moral￿ pressure on member states to reinvigo-
rate their reform efforts. In addition, the Commission also appears to provide ￿carrots￿ by praising 
those member states that were apparently quite successful in meeting the common European objec-
tives in pension policy. The extraordinarily positive evaluation of the Swedish reform record is a case 
in point.  
In 2003 and 2004 member states are expected to put forward progress reports concerning the imple-
mentation of their pension strategies. By the end of 2004, the Council and the Commission will assess 
the objectives and working methods established by the open method of coordination in the area of 
pensions and decide on the objectives, methods and the timetable of its continuation. In 2005 member 
states will again present national strategy reports.  
The establishment of such procedural routines can be seen as the most innovative element of the open 
method of coordination. It constitutes an iterative learning process based on the periodic monitoring 
of national reports and the systematic search for comparisons and knowledge. This will enable na-
tional officials, who are the key players in this process and who are often trapped in their country-
specific traditions, to challenge their existing understandings and to identify the strengths and weak-
nesses of their pension strategies (Dehousse 2002; Trubek and Mosher 2001). As convincingly argued 
by Hemerijck (2002:461) open coordination combines two types of policy learning: “learning from 
others, with a large element of ‘lesson drawing’ and mimicking based on the observation and presen-
                                                
10 Such a ranking would also be problematic because it would neglect substantial cross-national differences in 
the development of old-age dependency ratios. The projections made by Eurostat indicate that this ratio will not 
exceed a level of 40% in countries such as Denmark and Ireland until 2050. In Italy, by contrast, the old-age 
dependency ratio is projected to increase to more than 60% after 2040 (Economic Policy Committee 2001).   
11 This may be partly due to the fact that the development of comparable quantitative indicators on the financial 
sustainability of pension systems (including pension expenditure projections until 2050) is currently more ad-
vanced than the development of indicators capturing the adequacy of pensions.   University of Amsterdam 
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tation of the experience in other countries; and learning with others, or ‘interactive learning’, based 
on joint processing and exchange of information and experience”.    
  
3.3 THE PROBLEMS OF INDICATOR PRODUCTION 
 
The degree of goal attainment will be measured by means of both qualitative and quantitative indica-
tors. Thus far, however, the development of common indicators did not keep pace with the formula-
tion of broad common objectives. According to the initial time schedule commonly agreed indicators 
should be adopted at the Barcelona European Council in March 2002. Now, the entire catalogue of 
performance indicators is supposed to be adopted not later than 2004. To some extent, these delays 
result from the enormous technical difficulties associated with the production of reliable, valid, and 
comparable quantitative indicators, some of which are designed to cover the time span until 2050. 
They also reflect a political struggle over different priorities in pension policy between different ac-
tors. This struggle was by no means settled after the adoption of the eleven common objectives at the 
Laeken European Council. As pointed out above, most of these objectives remain rather vague. As a 
consequence, political conflicts over the direction of pension reform were at least partly shifted to the 
technical level of indicator production
12 (Husmann 2002). There may even be a certain danger that 
weak performing member states criticize the methodology by which a specific indicator is con-
structed rather than being concerned with the improvement of their performance (Benedictus 2002). 
For instance, it is contested whether the share of public pension expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
is an accurate indicator for the financial sustainability of national pension systems, especially with 
respect to its impact on the balance of the public budget. A major objection that is raised against this 
approach concerns the fact that public subsidies or generous tax relieves to private or occupational 
pension arrangements do also form a significant financial burden for the state, most notably in those 
countries where non-public pension schemes are of great significance. Hence, it is certainly not a 
chance that a country like Austria ￿ currently being the highest spender of all EU countries with re-
spect to public pension outlays ￿ pressed strongly for a more comprehensive set of indicators to cap-
ture the financial sustainability of national pension arrangements (cf. Spiegel 2002). In addition, 
countries with lean public pension arrangements may be forced to spend more on social assistance or 
housing benefits for old-age pensioners. This illustrates, that national policy makers have an interest 
to establish indicators that do not systematically discriminate against the type of pension arrange-
ments prevailing in their own country.       
                                                
12 This task is also jointly performed by the Economic Policy and the Social Protection Committee. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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It is therefore questionable whether the open method of coordination really allows for a significant 
degree of de-politicization, as stated by Hemerijck (2002). To be sure, the adoption of a medium-term 
perspective may pose a counterweight against the short-term electoral orientations typically prevail-
ing in the domestic arena of party politics. However, to the extent to which the formulation of pension 
policy objectives and the corresponding performance indicators is shifted from the national to the 
European level, political conflicts between EU member states will gain in importance. EU member 
states are likely to have different objectives and priorities with respect to pension reform depending 
among others on their highly diverse policy legacies, especially as far as the differences in the institu-
tional set-up of national pension systems are concerned. In addition, cross-national differences in 
economic development and problem load may hamper an agreement about common standards in pen-
sion policy, a problem that will become even more severe after Eastern enlargement. In short, while 
the open method of coordination might perhaps lower the adverse impact of party politics on pension 
policy-making it will also open up a new dimension of political conflict in the pension reform debate 
resulting from the divergence of interests between EU member states.          
The indicators currently under discussion can be summarized under three headings (see Schulz-
Weidner 2002): First, demographic and macro-economic indicators such as employment rates of eld-
erly persons, old-age dependency ratios or the long-term increase in pension outlays as a share of 
GDP. Second, indicators capturing qualitative features of national pension systems such as the statu-
tory retirement age or indexation procedures. Third, output indicators describing the income situation 
of the elderly such as effective income replacement ratios or the level of old-age poverty. The impor-
tance of such output indicators emerges from the fact that an exclusive focus on public and private 
systems of old-age provision is unlikely to allow for a complete and reliable picture of the income 
situation of the elderly. Factors such as the provision of health and elderly care, the taxation of pen-
sion income or the significance of means-tested benefits outside the public pension system must be 
taken into account if an accurate assessment of the retirees￿ living standard is to be obtained.  
Another problem associated with the production of indicators in the area of pension policy concerns 
the gathering of data about elements of inter- and intragenerational solidarity within a pension sys-
tem. An important question is, for instance, in how far pension credits for child rearing or elderly care 
should be taken into account as an indicator capturing solidaristic elements within a pension system 
(cf. Ruland 2002). Typically, such elements are of greater significance in countries with a strong pub-
lic pension pillar, which is by its very nature more redistributive than private pension schemes. As a 
consequence, Bismarckian pension arrangements are likely to display a better performance in country 
comparisons if this aspect is systematically taken into account.  University of Amsterdam 
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A more general problem of indicator production concerns the fact that reliable and comparable statis-
tical information on adequacy and inclusion are even more difficult to be achieved than information 
about the financial sustainability of pension systems. Hence, while the common objectives formulated 
at the European level suggest a rather even balance between financial and social concerns in pension 
policy, quantitative financial indicators are currently further developed than quantitative social indi-
cators. Consequently, financial aspects may still attract greater public attention in the European pen-
sion debate than social aspects. The reason is that quantitative indicators typically provide relatively 
condensed information about a country￿s relative performance. A wider audience (including the mass 
media) will find it much easier to grasp such information than more complex qualitative assessments 
of a pension system￿s output
13. 
Finally, there is a certain risk that the use of hard quantitative indicators may induce national gov-
ernments to design policy to achieve a numerical target to the detriment of other social or economic 
goals. A country may even be tempted to recast its activities so that statistical indicators record an 
improvement while no real change has actually taken place (cf. Atkinson et al. 2002). The numerous 
instances of ￿creative accounting￿ on the part of EMU member states suggest that this danger must 
not be underestimated.  
 
3.4 DIFFERENT VIEW ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OMC 
 
In the meantime an intense debate has emerged about the advantages and disadvantages of the open 
method of coordination and its likely impact on policy formation both at the national and at the Euro-
pean level. It is striking that academic experts as well as policy makers give completely different if 
not opposite answer to this issue. It appears that there is no common denominator whatsoever with 
respect to the judgment of the effectiveness of the open method of coordination. This may have a 
number of reasons. For one thing, the open method of coordination pursues multiple objectives at the 
same time. This is particularly true for open co-ordination on pensions serving both cognitive and 
normative functions. If seen as a specific form of benchmarking the OMC is primarily a cognitive 
tool (see table 4). Indeed, many authors regard policy learning as being at the heart of the open 
method of coordination (Hemerijck 2002; De la Porte and Pochet 2002; Scharpf 2002).  
However, opinions differ on how effective the open method of coordination is as an instrument for 
policy learning that encourages the transfer of ￿best practice￿ from other countries. From an optimistic 
point of view, the OMC provides an extraordinarily valuable platform for policy learning and innova-
tion that is much more useful than traditional forms of benchmarking that often do not pay insuffi-
cient attention to diverse local contexts. Moreover, it is emphasized that the OMC allows for inten-
sive consultation over the setting and modifying of policy objectives, guidelines and national action 
plans, with ongoing and repetitive feedback on implementation progress based on quantitative indica-
                                                
13 For an in-depth analysis of the problems of indicator construction with respect to social inclusion see Atkin-
son et al (2002). Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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tors. Hence, as argued by Hemerijck (2002:461), the open method of coordination forms a mecha-
nism by which ￿persistent heterogeneity may be exploited for purposes of experimentation and inno-
vation. Ongoing reforms in the member countries provide ample opportunity for the EU to further 
learning processes, particularly suited to policy innovation￿. According to Rodriguez (2001) the open 
method of coordination may even render the EU "a natural laboratory for policy experimentation￿. 
This rather optimistic evaluation is met with widespread skepticism, however. In particular, doubts 
are raised whether the open method of coordination has a significant impact on domestic policy for-
mation. Its potential benefits as a learning instrument can only accrue if those domestic actors who 
are in fact in control of the key policy choices engage themselves in the process of European co-
ordination. If this is not the case, the open method of coordination will ￿only educate national liaison 
officials who lack effective power at home￿ (Scharpf 2002:9). The drafting of National Action Plans 
may then primarily serve the function of ￿filling in the answers￿ and simply reflect the status quo of 
national policy routines without having any impact on the national reform discourse.  
The OMC might therefore also be misused for the purpose of mere ￿window dressing￿. Policy makers 
may even be tempted to exploit the OMC as an instrument for symbolic politics that helps them to 
avoid or at least to retard hard and painful political choices. Conversely, they may ￿ in pursuit of their 
own interests - employ the OMC strategically so as to alter the domestic discourse and to ￿shift the 
distribution of power over ideas and agenda setting￿ (Dyson 2000:5, cited in Hodson and Maher 
2001:722). In both cases, the open method of coordination will also become an instrument of political 
powering rather than a merely cognitive tool encouraging mutual exchange of information and ex-
perience. By the same token, however, the open method of coordination might offer a useful strategic 
device for reform-oriented governments to defend their own policy agenda against the proponents of 
the status quo in the domestic arena.    University of Amsterdam 
 
Chances and limitations of “benchmarking” in the reform of welfare state structures - the case of pension policy  38 
 
Table 4: Contrasting views on the effects of OMC in the area of pensions  
 
OMC as a normative tool to…..    OMC as a cognitive tool 
…. maintain financial 
sustainability 
….promote social justice 
OMC as the best tool to achieve 
common social objectives while 
respecting national diversity.  
Supports compliance 
with the obligations 
under the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth 
Pact through peer pres-
sure. 
OMC as a second-best alterna-
tive where hard law is not avail-
able.  
Peer pressure as a counterweight 




Promotion of continuous mutual 
learning and lesson-drawing in a 
contextualized fashion. EU as ￿a 
natural laboratory for policy 
experimentation￿.  
OMC as transitional step towards EU legislation 
Skeptical 
view 
OMC rather ineffective as a 
learning instrument as it is not 
integrated in domestic policy 
formation (lack of public aware-
ness and participation) 
Little impact on national 
pension strategies due to 
the lack of clear recom-
mendations and real 
sanctions. 
Cannot overcome the constitu-
tional asymmetry between mar-
ket-enhancing and market-




politics￿, Manipulation of public 
opinion 
Crowding out of hard 
legislation. 
Indirect pressure on EU member 
states to lower social standards. 
Crowding out of hard legislation. 
     
The open method of coordination is not only a cognitive but also a normative tool as it draws upon a 
catalogue of common objectives, potentially supplemented by common guidelines. Clearly, the for-
mulation of common objectives would not be necessary if the OMC was only considered as an in-
strument to improve the mutual exchange of information. Instead, its explicit aim is to achieve a 
greater policy convergence between EU member states. In that respect, the OMC can be seen as a 
supplement or even as an alternative to hard EU legislation. With respect to pensions, the common 
objectives can be subsumed under two headings: Fiscal sustainability and social adequacy. Obvi-
ously, there is a certain tension between these objectives and the open method of coordination may 
prove to be more effective in one goal dimension than in the other one.  
Before going into the question whether the OMC is an appropriate instrument to achieve a greater 
convergence of member states￿ pension policies, I will briefly recapitulate the arguments that are put 
forward to that effect. There are at least three reasons why a greater convergence of European pen-
sions systems might be considered as desirable: 
First, financially sustainable pension systems are a fundamental prerequisite to sound public finances 
and thus to the stability of the euro. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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Second, member states must avoid a process of competitive deregulation by which member states 
seek to improve their relative attractiveness as a location for investment by dismantling their welfare 
arrangements. In addition, member states might be tempted to lower the generosity of welfare bene-
fits in order to discourage the immigration of potential welfare recipients (Scharpf 2002). Hence, the 
obligation of member states to maintain a high level of social protection is also seen as a defense 
against a competitive ￿race to the bottom￿. 
Third, in the face of the increasing mobility of workers across member states, the EU must ensure the 
portability of pension rights across country borders.  
Its architects expect the open method of coordination to make a significant contribution to the solu-
tion of these coordination problems. However, there is plenty of debate among both scholars and pol-
icy makers on whether the OMC actually can meet these expectations. Concerning the aim of finan-
cial sustainability, the Commission considers the monitoring of national pension strategies as a neces-
sary supplement to hard legislation established under the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
As argued above, this is of particular concern for the economically oriented actors, who were the first 
to enter the pension debate in the European arena (de la Porte and Pochet 2002). These actors tend to 
employ the OMC as an instrument creating ￿peer pressure￿ on national governments to create fiscally 
sound pension systems as a precondition for a stable common currency. This may lead us to a more 
general argument: peer pressure will be most intense if the fundamental self-interests of other coun-
tries are at stake. This condition is rather obvious with respect to fiscal policy where the interdepend-
encies between EMU member states are strong. Such interdependencies are typically less strong as 
far as social objectives are concerned. For instance, high poverty rates in one country are unlikely to 
be of great concern to governments in other countries. Here, peer pressure will only result from a 
government￿s intrinsic commitment to shared values and its aversion to unfavorable international 
comparisons.  
In any case, peer pressure is unlikely to emerge, if, as argued above, the OMC remains confined to a 
narrow technocratic reporting process between high civil servants at the European level without any 
real involvement of the key political actors. Moreover, this pressure will be clearly less important for 
national governments than the pressure by their domestic constituencies, which tend to oppose painful 
welfare reforms. In general, the open method of coordination cannot alter the balance of political 
power in individual member states. Occasionally, the OMC is even seen as a potential threat to Treaty 
achievements that might over time crowd out hard legislation under the Community method. It is 
conceivable that governments become increasingly unwilling to comply with the hard and uncomfort-
able criteria for fiscal discipline established in the Maastricht Treaty. In this case they may misuse the 
soft regime of open coordination as a pretext to avoid the hard choices that are needed to maintain 
sound public budgets. 
The greatest disagreements concern the question of whether the open method of coordination can help 
to protect the so-called ￿European Social Model￿. Although the notion of the ￿European Social 
Model￿ appears to be quite vague it certainly includes the commitment to ensure a decent level of University of Amsterdam 
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social protection. With respect to pensions, the key question is whether OMC will meet its objective 
to maintain the adequacy of pensions. More specifically: can the OMC make an effective contribution 
to the fight against old-age poverty and support member states in their efforts to develop policies that 
allow all individuals to maintain their living standard after retirement? Does it provide an effective 
defense against a competitive ￿race to the bottom￿? Does it constitute a powerful counterweight to the 
traditional dominance of economically oriented players in the European pension debate and to the 
prerogative of market-enhancing policies in EU legislation? Concerning these questions at least four 
distinct positions can be identified: 
First, its proponents argue that the open method of coordination is the best strategy to actively pro-
mote social justice at the European level. According to Franck Vandenbroucke, the Belgian Minister 
of Social Affairs and Pensions, the open method of coordination is ￿the most promising way to give 
concrete shape to ‘social Europe’, as a large region in the world in which sustainable social justice 
will thrive￿ (2002:535f.). From this perspective, the crucial asset of the OMC ￿ compared to hard EU 
legislation ￿ is its great openness in terms of policy instruments, which takes into account the great 
diversity of national welfare arrangements within the European Union, most notably with respect to 
pension systems. Thus, centralized European decision-making in this area would neither be possible 
nor desirable.  
A second strand of opinion considers the OMC as a ￿second best option￿ to supranational law in those 
policy areas where member states are unwilling to delegate competencies to the European level. From 
this angle, hard European legislation would in principle be regarded as the potentially most effective 
strategy to promote ￿Social Europe￿. At the same time, it is acknowledged that this option is not (yet) 
available since member states fear an intrusion of the EU into their national arrangements. To be sure, 
this fear will be of particular importance in politically sensitive areas such as pensions. Nevertheless, 
the open method of coordination may be seen as a promising way to build a normative consensus 
around common social objectives. As argued by Scharpf (2002), it might also help to shaming gov-
ernments out of ￿beggar-my-neighbor￿ strategies. Moreover, the open method of coordination might 
also be welcomed as a first step towards intensified EU legislation in the area of social policy (Hod-
son and Maher 2001).  
Another line of argumentation is more skeptical about the potential effectiveness of the OMC as an 
instrument to promote the development of social policies at the European level. It is especially the 
soft character of open co-ordination in pension policy and its lack of real sanctions that is met with 
skepticism. As Leibfried (2002:474) puts it: ￿The OMC can be seen simply as a bypass operation, 
leaving the constitutional as well as the substantive problems of the heart untouched. The OMC in 
pensions, though, recognizes the 21
st century’s most immovable objects on the 15 national grounds. It 
also recognizes the 21
st century’s irresistible forces for change. And the OMC tries to cope with both 
in an amicable, but most likely, ineffective way.￿ In a similar fashion, Scharpf (2002) argues that the 
OMC cannot overcome the constitutional asymmetry between market-enhancing and market-
correcting policies within the European Union. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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Finally, concerns are raised that the open method of coordination (including the OMC in pensions) 
might even pose a threat to the core values of European welfare states. In particular, the application 
of the OMC might be used as a pretext not to adopt European legislative action in social policy, even 
if this was possible and desirable. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the economically oriented 
players may still find it easier to exploit the OMC ￿ even in its current shape ￿ more easily than the 
socially oriented players. For instance, as mentioned above, social indicators about the adequacy of 
pensions are still underdeveloped in comparison to financial indicators and may therefore receive in-
sufficient attention. Especially among trade unionists there is a widespread fear that the architects of 
the OMC ultimately strive for a radical dismantling of public and pay-as-you-go based pension sys-
tems. As a German trade union official put it: ￿Ich frage, ob es eine böswillige Interpretation ist, 
wenn man unterstellt, dass den offenen Koordinatoren folgende Gesamtstruktur der Alterssicherung 
vorschweben könnte: Eine erste Säule, gekennzeichnet durch Umverteilung mit der wesentlichen 
Aufgabe der Grundsicherung, eine zweite und dritte Säule mit Kapitaldeckung, aufgebaut nach dem 
Äquivalenzpostulat, finanziert ohne Belastung der Lohnnebenkosten und der öffentlichen Haushalte. 
Die offene Koordinierung kann das Instrument sein, um die Transformation anders aufgebauter 
Systeme zu befördern￿ (Standfest 2002:106).     
The debate about the effectiveness of the OMC is accompanied by a debate over its legitimacy. For 
one thing, concerns are raised that both the European Parliament and the national parliaments are not 
sufficiently involved in the process of open co-ordination, leading to a lack of democratic account-
ability. Another frequently raised concern about the open method of coordination is that it infringes 
the principle of subsidiarity by encouraging EU policy making in areas that used to be within the ex-
clusive purview of individual nation states. Even within the area of pension policy, where open co-
ordination appears to be a very soft process, national actors fear a shift of responsibilities from the 
national to the European level and thus a loss of influence on the process of policy-making (cf. Ru-
land 2002). To a certain extent, this issue also reflects an institutional power struggle between the 
Commission and the member states. In the meanwhile, however, calls for increased EU competencies 
in the field of pension policy are also raised by individual member states. For instance, during his in-
cumbency as President of the Council in summer 2003 the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi is seek-
ing to initiate the establishment of legally binding European guidelines in pension policy. This move 
seems to be largely driven by the motive to shift the blame for unpopular but necessary pension cuts 
to Brussels (Der Spiegel, 7
th June 2003). This again might enhance the political feasibility of pension 
reforms in the domestic arena, especially in countries like Italy where fiscal and demographic pres-
sures will require benefit curtailments to an extent that will even put the political survival of govern-
ments at stake. This clearly illustrates that the open method of coordination is a genuinely political 
and interest-based process that is by no means only an exercise in puzzling and problem solving.  
 
3.5 LESSONS FROM THE EES 
 University of Amsterdam 
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The above-sketched opinions and expectations concerning the effectiveness of the open method of 
coordination in the area of pensions are diverge considerably and can hardly be reduced to a common 
denominator. To a great extent, this reflects the multiplicity of political interests that are at stake. At 
the same time, however, it reflects the different views concerning the actual function of the OMC. 
Most importantly, there is ￿ at least implicitly ￿ disagreement on the question whether it is primarily a 
cognitive or a normative tool. Moreover, the process of open coordination in pensions is too new to 
allow for empirically validated insights on its effects on domestic policy formation. To what extent 
may we then resort to the experiences with processes of open coordination made in other policy ar-
eas? After running for five years on an annual basis, abundant empirical information is meanwhile 
available on the operation and impact of the EES as an important precursor to the OMC in the sphere 
of employment policy. This information is provided by the Commission itself, the member states and 
various academic sources. The overall verdict about the effects of the EES on national policies that 
emerges from these studies is at best mixed. Trubek and Mosher (2001) not only show that the EES 
contains significant learning-promoting mechanisms but also diagnose an impact on policy develop-
ment at the Union level. This is primarily reflected in the fact that significant changes took place in 
the EES guidelines themselves including the introduction of new elements in the Strategy. One ex-
ample for such a change is the requirement for member states to develop policies to keep older work-
ers in the workforce. The European Commission (2002a) itself arrives at an even more positive con-
clusion about the impact of the EES on national employment policies. It observes ￿a clear conver-
gence towards the active labor market principles of the EES￿ (p.9) and argues that the EES ￿has 
proven its worth￿ (p.16). However, these findings are not a sufficient proof for a strong causal rela-
tionship between the EES and domestic policy choices. It is perfectly conceivable that the EES sim-
ply restates what governments are doing anyway. In this case, its impact on the domestic process of 
policy formation might be limited. This finding is largely supported by a recent study on the imple-
mentation of the National Action Plans for Employment in the cases of Denmark and Sweden 
(Jacobsson and Schmid 2001) revealing only a low integration of the EES into the national agendas 
and activities. However, as argued by Benedictus (2002), there is certain evidence that the EES in 
some cases provided additional legitimacy to proposed policies. In sum, there is no clear and at best 
mixed evidence that the EES has strongly promoted policy learning within the member states or 
caused greater convergence among member states￿ employment policies.  
Moreover, the experiences made with respect to the EES may only be of limited value for a realistic 
assessment of the expected benefits of the OMC in pensions. They may even lead to wrong conclu-
sions. The European Employment Strategy and the open method of coordination in pensions deviate 
from one another in at least three crucial and interrelated dimensions.  
First, in contrast to the EES the OMC in pensions is a fairly light process that largely lacks clear 
guidelines and recommendations for action in particular at the level of individual countries. Secondly, 
the degree of institutional diversity and path-dependency with respect to pension systems is probably 
somewhat higher than is the case in the area of employment systems. Most importantly, fundamental Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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changes in pension policy typically require extraordinarily long transition periods to become fully 
implemented. Third, the overall objectives to be obtained are typically more ambiguous in the area of 
pension policy. In pension policy there is typically no clear hierarchy between financial and social 
objectives. Pension policy makers are expected to find a balance between the financial sustainability 
of national pension systems and their capacity to deliver safe and adequate pensions. Despite the fre-
quent notion of a common European Social Model the optimal balance to be achieved between these 
objectives may vary considerably from one country to another, in particular after Eastern enlarge-
ment, a variation that also reflects different standards of social solidarity. The very different levels of 
minimum protection in EU member states is a case in point. In Spain, for instance, the non-
contributory ￿social pension￿ for persons above 65 currently amounts to about 3600 Euro per year 
whereas in Luxembourg the corresponding payment exceeds 11000 Euro. By the same token, mem-
ber states appear to differ in the degree to which they tolerate ￿mild￿ old-age poverty (defined as an 
income below 60% of median income). While severe old-age poverty (below 40% of median income) 
is largely abolished throughout the EU, mild old-age poverty appears to be much more widespread in 
some member states than in others: In Greece, Ireland and Portugal about one third of the older peo-
ple receive less than 60% of the median income, whereas the corresponding ratio is below 10% in 
countries such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden (European Commission 2002). Under 
the assumption that these differences in welfare outcomes reflect at least partly different aspiration 
levels in member states￿ social policies it will be hard to identify a common European Social Model 
with respect to old-age provision. Obviously, there is no common standard of social solidarity within 
the EU on which all member states could agree. This is clearly different with respect to employment 
objectives. In all member states, employment policy appears to be primarily motivated by one over-
arching and largely uncontested goal, i.e. to increase employment levels. Here, other objectives seem 
to be only of secondary importance. In short, member states share the common objective of achieving 
or maintaining high levels of employment but they adopt very different positions with respect to the 
trade-offs between social and economic objectives. Due to these factors the real impact of open coor-
dination on national pension strategies will be even more difficult to prove empirically than the influ-
ence of the EES on national employment policies.      University of Amsterdam 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper I have sought an answer to the question whether benchmarking across countries can be 
an effective instrument in the reform of national welfare arrangements. I have discussed a number of 
reasons why benchmarking does not necessarily lead to an actual transfer of welfare policies. In gen-
eral, the transfer of ￿good practice￿ from one welfare state to another appears to be qualitatively dif-
ferent from transfer of ￿ good practise￿ between companies. Second, there is a considerable risk that a 
decontextualized form of benchmarking may actually lead to inappropriate policy transfer. Moreover, 
national debates over the pros and cons of social policy instruments adopted in other countries will 
often reflect the material or institutional self-interests of the actors involved rather than serious efforts 
to learn from other countries￿ experiences. In so far, benchmarking can be said to be a two-edged 
sword that may be easily exploited for political reasons.  
At the same time, however, the insights obtained from comparisons with other countries may also 
generate a beneficial political pressure on political actors. Most importantly, the systematic compari-
son with other countries, especially if based on quantitative indicators, may expose the weaknesses of 
a country￿s policy. To the extent to which this is picked out as a central theme in the domestic policy 
discourse, national governments will have a powerful incentive to take action in order to improve 
their electoral standing. By the same token, such information may help governments to overcome the 
resistance of potential reform opponents. The latter may find it much more difficult to make them-
selves heard in the larger public if the reform-oriented forces can justify the need for change with ref-
erences to successful reforms adopted in other countries. At best, benchmarking may transform the 
preferences of political actors that hitherto used to oppose changes to the status quo. Benchmarking 
may not only facilitate the recognition of unpleasant facts but also broaden the knowledge about po-
tentially effective and politically feasible policy responses that hitherto were largely ignored by the 
political actors. Insofar, benchmarking is often used not only as a cognitive but also as a political in-
strument to organize support for necessary policy change. 
This also holds true for the open method of coordination. As a cognitive tool, the open method of co-
ordination appears to be superior to traditional forms of benchmarking. Perhaps most importantly, it 
is a highly contextualized method of benchmarking, which avoids - mostly inappropriate - ￿one-size-
fits-all￿ recommendations. Instead, it seeks to pay attention to different local conditions and respects 
the institutional diversity of national welfare arrangements. Moreover, it is an iterative and flexible 
process of policy learning, based on ongoing and repetitive feedback of implementation progress 
(through periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review) with objectives and guidelines being revis-
able in the light of evaluation and new information. At the same time, this method is designed to use a 
broad set of empirical data and common indicators of achievements. This aspect is particularly rele-
vant for pension policy. Here, the intension is to develop a catalogue of both economic and social in-
dicators on national pension systems, preferably on a quantitative basis, which not only allows for 
reliable comparisons across countries for the time being but also for prospective information about University of Amsterdam 
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the likely development of these indicators in the long run. This will create an extraordinarily valuable 
empirical data basis that goes far beyond previous efforts made in this area. Finally, the open method 
of coordination clearly distinguishes itself from traditional benchmarking procedures in that it seeks 
to include a broad range of state and non-state actors at the European, the national and the sub-
national level. For instance, in many cases the social partners directly or indirectly participated in the 
drafting of the national strategy reports. This is likely to spread knowledge of other countries￿ prac-
tices over a wider audience, enrich and stimulate deliberation on the pros and cons of various reform 
measures, increase the political support to and therewith the legitimacy of open coordination and 
strengthen its anchoring within the domestic process of policy formation. It is notable, that a recent 
conference on open coordination of old-age security attracted more than 200 participants from all 
over Europe representing an extraordinarily broad range of public and private organizations in the 
field of politics, administration and research as well as numerous institutions directly or indirectly 
concerned with old-age protection
14. Hence, the open method of coordination may be a promising 
tool to promote the exchange of reliable and relevant information and to encourage policy learning on 
the part of policy makers.  
However, there is still considerable potential to enhance the significance of the open method of coor-
dination in domestic politics. Most importantly, national parliaments need to play a greater role in the 
overall process. National Action Plans, the Commission￿s evaluations and possible recommendations 
on the part of the Council should become subject to parliamentary debates (WRR 2003). This would 
increase the awareness of the OMC not only on the part of national policy makers but probably also 
on the part of the mass media. This again may stimulate deliberation and discussion in the wider pub-
lic and at least indirectly induce national governments to deal with the OMC and its findings more 
seriously, especially if they indicate grave weaknesses in a country￿s policy performance. If such a 
debate emerges, the open method of coordination is likely to be a mixed blessing for national gov-
ernments. Reform-oriented policy makers may feel themselves assured in their reform efforts. Re-
form-averse governments, by contrast, may perceive the OMC as a potential threat, pressing them for 
action in areas where they would rather have avoided necessary but politically sensitive reforms. In 
both cases, however, the OMC will have a beneficial impact on the reform process at the national 
level.   
By the same token, however, we should not expect that a tighter linkage between open co-ordination 
and domestic policy debates would lead to a less politicized and primarily problem-oriented process 
of policy formation. As argued above, the open method of coordination itself is a genuinely political 
process. To a considerable extent the OMC can be said to be a power struggle in which multiple ac-
tors try to assert their own ideas, concepts and problem definitions. Most importantly, this reflects 
conflicts between socially- and economically-oriented policy makers. This power struggle also re-
volves around the definition of appropriate indicators. In an ideal situation, indicators are seen as 
                                                
14 The conference was organized by the Federation of German Pension Insurance Institutions and held in Berlin 
on 26 and 27 March 2003. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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￿neutral￿ and ￿objective￿ tools to diagnose and assess the nature of a problem. As such they may help 
policy makers in puzzling over adequate policies. However, the indicators themselves may be con-
tested. Moreover, even commonly agreed indicators do not necessarily suggest commonly agreed pol-
icy responses. Quantitative benchmarks may for instance indicate the fiscal imbalances of a pension 
system. However, there may still be considerable disagreement about the appropriate strategies by 
which this problem is to be addressed, especially in the case of highly redistributive policies such as 
pensions.   
One might argue that such conflicts may be settled more easily if the open method of coordination 
provided clearer guidelines and targets to national policy makers. Hence, with respect to pension pol-
icy some authors argue that the OMC needs to become harder than it currently is (cf. WRR 2003). 
Open co-ordination on pensions is still a fairly light mode of governance. While it establishes a num-
ber of common but very general objectives, it lacks not only the possibility of real sanctions but also 
clearly specified recommendations to individual member states as well as quantitative targets as they 
were for instance established by the EES. As a result, open coordination on pensions provides only 
limited guidance to national policy makers as far as concrete directions for reform are concerned. 
Of course, one might see this as a weakness. However, even the establishment of common quantita-
tive targets in pension policy will meet with considerable difficulties. These difficulties emerge most 
clearly if we consider a number of structural differences between pension and employment policy 
where EU member states came to accept common quantitative targets, such as a total employment 
ratio of 70% to be achieved until 2010. In pension policy a similar approach may even turn out to be 
counterproductive. As argued above, objectives in pension policy are more ambiguous than in em-
ployment policy, where employment growth is generally seen as the dominant aim. Moreover, in pen-
sion policy there is also a greater tension between different objectives, especially between social ade-
quacy and fiscal sustainability. At the same time, member states differ greatly in the institutional de-
sign of their pension systems, their standards of social solidarity, their level of economic development 
(especially after the Eastern enlargement), and their (current and future) age-structure. These factors 
will have a significant impact on the way individual member states deal with the trade-off between 
social adequacy and fiscal sustainability. In other words, member states are likely to emphasise the 
various objectives in pension policy differently according to their specific national conditions. As a 
consequence, they will be unlikely to find a common denominator in terms of quantitative targets to 
be achieved. Public spending on pensions is a case in point. It is doubtful whether the European Un-
ion should for instance define an appropriate level or an upper limit for public pension expenditures 
for all member states in order to ensure the financial sustainability of public budgets - even if social 
assistance to the elderly and tax revenues on private and occupational pensions were included. Mem-
ber states with a higher GDP per capita or with a higher share of elderly persons may be willing or 
even forced to spend considerably more than other member countries on old-age provision. This illus-
trates the difficulties to establish common quantitative targets with respect to pension reform (never-
theless, comparable quantitative indicators may still form a valuable source of information for na-University of Amsterdam 
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tional policy makers). By the same token, it will be problematic to fix uniform European guidelines 
for national pension policy makers. Thus, in order to maintain its context-sensitivity open coordina-
tion on pensions needs to remain soft and non-coercive. 
Against this background the open method of co-ordination will hardly lead to a greater degree of pol-
icy convergence between the member states. For instance, there is no reason to think that co-
ordination at the European level may in the foreseeable future lead to the establishment of a compre-
hensive and non-means tested guaranteed minimum pension in all member countries, as for instance 
suggested by Schokkaert and van Parijs (2002:508). In most of the Bismarckian welfare states with 
their strong reliance on earnings-related social insurance such a concept will hardly have a political 
chance to be implemented. Thus, as a normative tool aimed to strengthen the European Social Model, 
the open method of co-ordination may in fact be of a rather limited value.  
It should also be kept in mind that the open method of coordination does not alter the powerful con-
straints within which national pension policy-makers must operate. National pension systems are con-
fronted with a bunch of powerful legal, political, fiscal and economic pressures and constraints. These 
factors considerably limit the leeway for national governments in pension policy. Demographic, eco-
nomic and fiscal pressures exert a strong downward pressure on pension benefit levels, while legal 
and political factors tend to impede a radical dismantling of pension entitlements (Schludi 2002). The 
open method of co-ordination cannot fundamentally change these constraints but must take them as 
given. Hence, with respect to pension reform we should not overestimate the impact of the open 
method of co-ordination. Its most promising benefits appear to lie in the cognitive rather than in the 
normative function. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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APPENDIX: BROAD COMMON OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF PENSIONS 
 
•  Adequacy of pensions 
 
Member States should safeguard the capacity of pension systems to meet their social 
objectives. To this end against the background of their specific national circumstances they 
should: 
 
1. Ensure that older people are not placed at risk of poverty and can enjoy a decent standard of liv-
ing; that they share in the economic well-being of their country and can accordingly participate ac-
tively in public, social and cultural life3; 
 
2. Provide access for all individuals to appropriate pension arrangements, public and/or private, 
which allow them to earn pension entitlements enabling them to maintain, to a reasonable degree, 
their living standard after retirement; and 
 
3. Promote solidarity within and between generations. 
 
•  Financial sustainability of pension systems 
 
 Member States should follow a multi-faceted strategy to place pension systems on a sound 
financial footing, including a suitable combination of policies to: 
 
4. Achieve a high level of employment through, where necessary, comprehensive labour market re-
forms, as provided by the European Employment Strategy and in a way consistent with the BEPG;. 
 
5. Ensure that, alongside labour market and economic policies, all relevant branches of social pro-
tection, in particular pension systems, offer effective incentives for the participation of older workers; 
that workers are not encouraged to take up early retirement and are not penalised for staying in the 
labour market beyond the standard retirement age; and that pension systems facilitate the option of 
gradual retirement; 
 
6. Reform pension systems in appropriate ways taking into account the overall objective of maintain-
ing the sustainability of public finances. At the same time sustainability of pension systems needs to 
be accompanied by sound fiscal policies, including, where necessary, a reduction of debt. Strategies 
adopted to meet this objective may also include setting up dedicated pension reserve funds; 
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7. Ensure that pension provisions and reforms maintain a fair balance between the active and the 
retired by not overburdening the former and by maintaining adequate pensions for the latter; and 
 
8. Ensure, through appropriate regulatory frameworks and through sound management, that private 
and public funded pension schemes can provide pensions with the required efficiency, affordability, 
portability and security. 
 
•  Modernization of pension systems in response to changing needs of the economy, society 
and individuals. 
 
9. Ensure that pension systems are compatible with the requirements of flexibility and security on the 
labor market; that, without prejudice to the coherence of Member States' tax systems, labor market 
mobility within Member States and across borders and non-standard employment forms do not penal-
ize people's pension entitlements and that self-employment is not discouraged by pension systems; 
 
10. Review pension provisions with a view to ensuring the principle of equal treatment between 
women and men, taking into account obligations under EU law; and 
 
11. Make pension systems more transparent and adaptable to changing circumstances, so that citi-
zens can continue to have confidence in them. Develop reliable and easy-to-understand information 
on the long-term perspectives of pension systems, notably with regard to the likely evolution of benefit 
levels and contribution rates. Promote the broadest possible consensus regarding pension policies 
and reforms. Improve the methodological basis for efficient monitoring of pension reforms and poli-
cies. 
 
Source: Council of the European Union 2001 Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
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